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Abstract
 Chinese agricultural investments in Africa have grown 
significantly in the past two decades, but there remains 
very little empirical research on the nature of these 
investments. This paper aims to address this knowledge 
gap by looking at three different types of Chinese 
investors in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector: a National 
State Owned Enterprise (SOE), a Provincial SOE and a 
private company. Collectively, their experiences not only 
challenge the pervasive view that Chinese companies 
are progressing at unstoppable rates in African markets, 
but also raise deeper questions about the importance 
of company structures, financial stability and the 
environments in which they operate. 
Key words: outward investment, agricultural outward 
investment, China-Africa cooperation
Introduction
Along with its rapid economic growth over the last 
four decades, China’s outward foreign investment has 
expanded significantly. This process began in the 1980s 
with the implementation of a ‘going global’ strategy (走
出去战略) and was greatly accelerated after China joined 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002. From an 
annual average of below US$3bn before 2005, China’s 
outward foreign investment flows grew to US$20bn in 
2006, and more than US$50bn in 2008. By 2010 flows 
reached US$60bn amid declining levels of global Foreign 
Direct Investment FDI, making China one of the world’s 
top ten exporters of direct investment in the post-crisis 
years (Daniel et al. 2012). Between 2012 and 2013, China’s 
official FDI increased by a further 15 percent from 
US$88bn to US$101bn (UNCTAD 2014), a development 
that has attracted mixed reactions worldwide.
Based on the Chinese FDI data of 2012, the top five 
economic sectors of outward investment are tenancy 
and business services (US$26.7bn annually), mining 
(US$13.5bn), wholesale and retail (US$13.0bn), financial 
services (US$10.1bn) and manufacturing (US$8.7bn). 
Agriculture was only of peripheral importance among 
the sectors that China invests in; however, the share of 
that sector in the country’s overseas investment portfolio 
has been rising, from 0.86 percent in 2005 to 1.66 percent 
in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). 
With regards to Africa in particular, the continent only 
makes up 4 percent of Chinese FDI stock (MOFCOM 2014); 
however, this has increased steadily in recent years, and 
from the African perspective China is now the continent’s 
third largest investor as well as the continent’s largest 
trade partner (UNCTAD 2013; MOFCOM 2011). Various 
actors are at the forefront of these investments, each 
with different drivers and pull-factors that lead them to 
Africa. While some might be focused specifically around 
big cities in Africa with a view to sell in local markets, 
other investments may serve niche markets such as the 
supply of food materials to Chinese restaurants and 
companies (Cook 2015). These are often broadly 
categorised as private sector actors, State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and hybrid mixtures of the two.
In the agricultural sector there were 141 enterprises 
registered with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce that 
had invested in Africa in 2012. Among them were 46 
SOEs (non-listed enterprises), 54 privately owned 
enterprises (non-listed enterprises), seven listed 
companies, three joint state-private enterprises and 31 
other enterprises that could not be classified into any of 
the listed categories (MOFCOM 2014). 
Indeed, agriculture has remained the most important 
livelihood activity for most African countries, estimated 
to be employing 75 percent of the continent’s population 
(Basara 2014). Within this context, the need for more 
Chinese engagement with African agriculture has been 
a recurring theme at successive Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences since their inception 
(Gabas and Tang 2014; Bräutigam and Tang 2009). The 
three main targets for Chinese agricultural investments 
in Africa are farming, fishing operations and agro-
processing. Separately, there is also an increasing amount 
of trade in farm tools and agrochemicals (Spring 2009). 
Having established a strong relationship with 
Zimbabwe during its independence struggle, it is no 
coincidence that the country has become an important 
economic partner of China’s as the ‘Going Global’ strategy 
looks towards Africa. Since 2011, Zimbabwe has become 
one of the top three African destinations for Chinese 
investment, with China’s non-financial direct investments 
in Zimbabwe increasing from US$460m in 2011 to 
US$602m in 2013 which was the largest amount of 
Chinese investment in all African countries (Lin 2014). 
Trade between the two countries has continued to 
expand over the years and surpassed US$1.1bn in 2013; 
almost doubling the 2010 level. The balance of trade is 
in Zimbabwe’s favour with the Southern African country’s 
exports to China in 2013 valued at US$688m with its 
imports at US$414m (Ibid). Zimbabwe welcomed such 
investment as it came when the when the country was 
still largely ostracised as an investment destination by 
the West. As at the end of May 2014, eight Chinese 
companies had set up investments in Zimbabwe’s in 
agricultural sector.
In this context, our study will seek to better understand 
these investments by looking in depth at the different 
types of Chinese companies involved and how they 
engage in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. This will be 
followed by a presentation of some of the more significant 
cultural, institutional and environmental challenges that 
each of these investors face in pursuing their various 
interests. The paper will then conclude by asking whether 
there are any discernable connections that can be made 
between the nature of the company and the outcome 
of their engagements. Throughout this paper our analysis 
will move beyond the simplistic discourses of ‘land grabs’, 
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‘neo- colonialism’ or ‘neo-imperialism’ that have often 
come to shroud discussions of China-Africa relations 
(Bräutigam 2011).
Literature review
In the twenty-first century, China’s increased economic 
engagements with Africa have come to be of great 
interest within academia and the media, in Western 
countries initially (Bräutigam 2011; Alden 2005), and 
increasingly in Africa and China too (Manji and Marks 
2007; Gaye 2006; Shi 1989). Present in many of these 
narratives, however, is the assumption that China’s 
growing presence in Africa means that its business 
interests are moving from strength to strength. Some 
argue that this is at the expense of local interests, others 
that this success is mutually beneficial. Regardless, this 
macro-view of Chinese business engagements often 
overlooks the day to day challenges that many of these 
companies face.
The most repeated narrative is that China’s agricultural 
engagement in Africa is a form of neo-colonialism (Large 
2008; Zafar 2007; Tull 2006). Other narratives suggest 
that China’s investments in Africa are aimed at buying 
energy, food and raw materials, and securing political 
support from state leaders (Taylor 2010). In this framing, 
African countries are viewed as little more than a ‘resource’ 
for China, and just as the Europeans did during 
colonialism, they are also exploiting Africa as a market 
to sell their goods (Zhao 2014). 
Other major concerns raised on Chinese investments 
include the neglect of local labour rights and the 
undermining of employment opportunities. For instance, 
low agricultural wages in Africa are certainly part of the 
attraction for the Chinese to invest in African agriculture 
(Kevin et al. 2014) and there have been reports of some 
Chinese entrepreneurs discriminating against local 
workers and keeping wages low and such practices have 
made local workers resent Chinese businesses (Zhao 
2014). 
Furthermore, Chinese investments are also accused 
of bringing unwelcome competition. For example, in 
Zambia, Chinese companies have invested in more than 
20 farms and their products are now a major feature on 
the Zambian domestic market (Bräutigam and Tang 2009; 
Xinhua 2006). These criticisms come despite the fact that 
Chinese investments may also positively influence local 
employment opportunities. 
What is particular about Chinese investments in 
agriculture, however, is the claim that they have resulted 
in ‘land grabs’ across the continent (Alden 2013; Spring 
2009). This argument is often based on a premise 
concerning China’s own internal agricultural pressures. 
This involves the very real concern that urbanisation in 
China has resulted in the shrinking of the country’s 
farmland. The expanding population and higher life 
expectancy have also resulted in even less cultivated 
land being able to meet the growing demands (Lu 2015). 
However, in seeking to answer how China will meet its 
food security needs in the near future, this has led to the 
acceptance of a narrative that China will buy up African 
farmland (Alden 2005). This claim has been repeatedly 
exposed as false, as there are still relatively few 
occurrences of Chinese companies acquiring land leases, 
let alone any sizeable ones (Smaller et al. 2012; Bräutigam 
and Tang 2009).
As Guo Chatelard (2014) argues, many critiques focus 
on what China wants to get from Africa, with few 
reporting on the real activities of Chinese investments 
in Africa. Further studies by Bräutigam and Zhang (2013) 
concluded similarly that that numerous media reports 
on the subject of Chinese agricultural investments are 
unreliable and lack evidence, and that the overwhelming 
focus on China’s policies is unhelpful. Furthermore, in 
many cases, Chinese companies are being invited by 
African states to boost FDI, which is foreseen to benefit 
both China and Africa. This is happening at a time when 
many developed countries have decreased their 
investments and aid in Africa, arguably making China’s 
FDI all the more important (Chen et al. 2014). 
In sum, the most common critiques of Chinese 
investment in Africa that appear in the current literature 
have three major deficiencies that can lead to 
unconvincing conclusions. First, most critiques just focus 
on what China can get from Africa, but neglect the benefit 
to Africa itself. The positive function of Chinese 
investments and economic activities is minimised and 
the negatives are accentuated. Second, the methodology 
of many papers and reports is dubious; some depend 
on news reports and other second-hand information 
sources without first-hand investigation and confirmation. 
Third, irrespective of whether commentators have 
argued in favour or against Chinese business 
engagements in Africa, most have ignored the challenges 
and difficulties that arise at the micro level. Instead, 
conclusions have often been based on a hypothesis of 
perceived success.
It this last point in particular that the following paper 
will seek to address. For this we draw on firsthand 
information collected from three Chinese companies in 
Zimbabwe. The fieldwork was undertaken in 2014, 
focusing on two SOEs and one privately owned company. 
During our investigations, we conducted interviews with 
a cross section of stakeholders which included 
government officials, company leaders, middle-level 
managers, workers and farmers. Structured and semi-
structured interview guides were developed and tested 
before being used to collect data. 
The three companies interviewed were all agricultural 
enterprises and their lines of business can be categorised 
into two groups: the first are engaged in cash crops such 
as tobacco and cotton and the other works with food 
crops such as maize and wheat. Wanjin Company is one 
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of the three companies and is a joint venture between 
a Chinese state-owned company and local holders of 
large commercial farms. Tianze Tobacco Company is a 
branch of a Chinese state-owned tobacco company and 
China Africa Cotton Company (CAC) is a privately owned 
company. Table 1 below gives an overview of these 
companies, and it is to their structures and engagements 
in Zimbabwe that we now turn.
Wanjin Company Tianze Tobacco China Africa Cotton
Enterprise property Provincial SOE Central SOE Private 
Capital source Bank loan Self-raised fund China-Africa Development
Fund and self-raised fund
Business model Farm production Contract farming and 
tobacco ty
Contract farming
Main products Soybean, maize, 
wheat
Tobacco Cotton 
Product marketing Local market China Local market and China 
Year of commencement of 
Zimbabwe operation
2010 2004 2013
Table 1: Basic information on the selected three Chinese companies
Source: Key informant interviews
Information on the three 
companies
Wanjin Company
Wanjin Company was founded in 2010 by Anhui 
Farming, a provincial state-owned company, operating 
with the support of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). The MoD offered information on large-scale 
commercial farms for potential cooperation agreements 
and then facilitated the contracts between them and the 
farmers. Following a major land reform programme in 
Zimbabwe from 2000, the majority of new commercial 
farms have, for a host of reasons, failed to fully utilise 
their allocated land. Lack of capital has been cited as a 
major constraint, with one farmer lamenting: ‘We have 
no money to invest on our farm and most of [the] 
commercial farms have accumulated huge debts with 
the banks.’ Another of the local farmers told the researchers 
that some commercial farms had been abandoned and 
agricultural infrastructure and equipment had been 
either vandalised or stolen. 
The MoD, through government-to-government 
bilateral arrangements, approached Anhui Farming to 
set up a joint farming scheme to resuscitate production 
on underutilised commercial farms in a prime farming 
area around Chinhoyi town in northern Zimbabwe. The 
tie-up between Anhui and Zimbabwe’s MoD was not 
surreptitious, as it built on links between the armies and 
ruling parties of the two countries. At present, the 
company has established joint farming schemes with 
four local farms. The farmers offer their land to Wanjin 
Company and receive rent, while also working for the 
company as managers. Each farm ranges in size from 
700-800ha and the total area under the scheme is about 
3,000ha. The main crops grown are maize and soybean 
in summer and wheat under irrigation in winter. 
The general manager of Wanjin Company, Mr. He, said 
that,
In the beginning the owners of farms did not know 
us and neither did they trust us. We had to depend 
on the MoD to develop linkages with other farms. 
Now we have developed our business with them for 
three years. Our cooperating partners are benefiting 
from our investment and more and more owners 
come to talk with me voluntarily. They are keen 
on our investment. About ten local farmers have 
approached us and we found eight of them have 
high potential.
The common features of these farms are:
1)  They were transferred to locals from white farmers 
as part of the land reform programme.
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2)  Only a small part of land has been cultivated and 
the local owners lack enough capital to carry out 
further agricultural production.
 
For example, in one farm of 800ha of arable land the 
owner could only cultivate 43ha of maize, 18ha of 
soybean, 1ha of potato, 21ha of tobacco and 11ha of 
bamboo. The total cultivated land is therefore about 
94ha, or only 11.75 percent utilisation.2  Furthermore, 
the farm’s irrigation system had been destroyed and they 
have accumulated a debt of about US$180,000. The 
owner confirmed that he can no longer borrow money 
from the local bank to support his farming operations 
and he fears that the government could repossess the 
farm. 
Under the joint-venture cooperation programme, 
Wanjin Company provides all of the agricultural 
machinery and equipment required as well as working 
capital. Wanjin Company is then entitled to 50 percent 
of net profits made on the harvest. The investment in 
fixed assets for the resuscitation of a farm is quite high. 
According to the information provided by one of the 
Chinese managers at one such farm, an investment of 
at least US$2m is required for each farm for tractors, a 
pumping station, a combine harvester, tractor-drawn 
trailers, ploughs, an irrigation system, warehouse repair 
and land development. Furthermore, the working capital 
for annual input requirements is about US$60,000. In the 
first two years the typical farm was forecast to make no 
profits, and at best break even. In 2013, however, one of 
the farms turned over from deficit to profit and about 
US$120,000 was disbursed to the owner. 
Another problem faced in these joint farming 
agreements is that almost all of the commercial farms 
are carrying over heavy debts with the banks. The Wanjin 
Company has agreed to repay this debt to the bank and 
such payments constitute a significant component of 
the farming turnover. ‘Without input from Chinese, it 
would be very difficult to continue farming,’ a holder of 
one branch farm told the researchers. ‘Around this farm 
a lot of commercial farms have been left fallow.’ 
The Wanjin Company has set up a headquarters + 
branch farms model to manage the farms. The 
headquarters consists of the Board, general manager 
and six departments which are Product, Finance, 
Marketing, Security, Audit and Human Resources. The 
administrative positions are shared by Chinese and 
Zimbabweans but the Chinese dominate at the 
management level. The headquarters also manages a 
branch farm directly to save staff costs. The other three 
branch farms are managed separately by one Chinese 
manager and a Zimbabwean deputy manager. The 
headquarters approves the annual agricultural plan and 
budget, allocates the financial resources needed, sets 
down the target yield for each branch farm, purchases 
required agricultural inputs and undertakes sales for all 
crops. As an incentive, when the branch farm attains the 
targeted yield within the budget set by the headquarters, 
they are entitled to an additional bonus. At the time of 
Chinese Zimbabwean 
Board of Directors 1 Chairman of the Board
1 Director 
1 Deputy Chairman of Board
1 Director 
1 Secretary 
General Manager 1 General Manger
1 Deputy General Manager
1 Deputy General Manger
Department of Finance, 
Production and Marketing
1 Manager for each Department 1 Deputy Manager for each 
Department
Department of Human Resources, 
Audit and Security 
1 Deputy Manager for each
Department
1 Manger for each Department
Branch Farm 1 Manager for each Branch Farm 3-5 Deputy Manager for each
Branch Farm 
Table 2: The administrative set-up of Wanjin Company
Source: Key informant interviews
conducting the fieldwork this incentive scheme appeared 
to be working, as the four farms were competing amongst 
themselves to increase yields and profits.
 
The Wanjin Company now has 14 Chinese staff and 
all of them are at the administrative and managerial 
levels. The company has hired many locals as general 
hands, including six administrative staff at its 
headquarters. At the time of conducting the field survey, 
the company had on its establishment 12 deputy farm 
managers, three security managers and 195 formal 
contract workers that included security guards, drivers 
and agricultural machinery repairers. All the employees 
were full-time staff. The company was paying its 
employees agreed salaries at the end of each month and 
paying school fees for the children of its employees. In 
addition, the Company is conforming to statutory 
requirements regarding workmen compensation and 
social security.  The company also offers free housing to 
its employees and provides safe (treated) water and 
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electricity for domestic use. Furthermore, the Company 
each year hires a number of casual workers during the 
busy season for such operations as planting, weeding 
and harvesting. In the summer of the 2013/2014 season, 
the company hired about 370 casual workers. Casual 
workers are paid at least the minimum wage stipulated 
by the government and are paid at a higher rate for 
overtime work and work done over the holidays. Wanjin 
provides lunch to all its workers, including casuals. The 
salaries for all types of local employees are higher than 
what local non-Wanjin farmers pay on average, and meet 
the legal minimum requirements. 
The main crops grown by Wanjin Company are maize, 
wheat and soybean; all for the local market. One branch 
of farms has 50 ha of tobacco. 
Some criticisms of Chinese agricultural investment in 
Africa suggest that ventures are intended to export food 
crops back home to meet the increasing needs of China’s 
domestic market. The Wanjin Company shared with the 
researchers records of crops that were sold to local food 
companies including National Foods, a major food-
manufacturing company. National Foods contacts Wanjin 
in April each year to negotiate a purchasing contract for 
summer crops, and the price has been 20 percent higher 
than on the local market due to the premium placed on 
quality and convenience with large volumes and 
guaranteed supply. 
Tianze Company
In China, the cigarette market is dominated by the 
State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which is 
responsible for all aspects of the industry’s ‘staff, finance, 
properties, products, supply, distribution, and domestic 
and foreign trade’ (Gov.cn 2005). These operations are 
carried out through the China National Tobacco 
Corporation (CNTC), an SEO that is estimated to contribute 
roughly 7 percent of the state’s revenue each year (He 
et al. 2013) making it one of China’s most important 
companies. Internationally it is also the largest company 
of its kind, largely due to the fact that China makes up 
roughly one third of the world’s smoking population 
(WHO undated). In 2013 CNTC was reported to have 
manufactured 2.5 trillion cigarettes whereas its next 
largest competitor, Philip Morris, manufactured only 880 
billion, and its revenue in 2012 was estimated at 
US$170bn (Martin 2014).
Zimbabwe’s worldwide reputation for high quality 
tobacco first attracted CNTC to trade as a buyer on its 
auction floors, and in 2005 the company established a 
subsidiary branch called Tianze. Tianze purchases 
tobacco in two ways. First, it has contract farming 
agreements with local farmers and provides them with 
all the inputs and equipment required. Second, it 
purchases from other tobacco companies or buyers, such 
as Northern Tobacco, the Mashonaland Tobacco 
Company (MTC) and Midriver. Tianze has thus become 
the largest customer of Zimbabwe’s tobacco. The size of 
the crop marketed in 2014 was 109,000t and Tianze 
accounted for 62,626t (57.5 percent). Of this, 15,000t were 
acquired through its contract farming agreements and 
the rest was bought indirectly through other companies 
and independent farmers at auction floors.
Tianze has five departments; the management of 
tobacco production is overseen by a production manager, 
some contract farming managers and five area managers. 
There are 11 Chinese managers in the company, seven 
seconded by CNTC and four hired in Zimbabwe. There 
are 87 contract employees from Zimbabwe and five of 
them are senior managers in different departments being 
paid industry-competitive salaries. In each department 
there are two to three local employees in charge of 
administrative affairs. Tianze also provides these local 
administrative staff with special incentives such as a free 
trip to China. From February to August each year, the 
company hires an additional 100 short term workers for 
the peak period of processing tobacco. The workers’ 
average salary is slightly lower than what some of the 
more established companies are offering but not lower 
than that set for the industry. All staff have medical 
insurance cover as well as accident insurance and 
endowment insurance. The company pays a total of 
US$20,000 per month in insurance cover for its workers.
As a sign of its confidence in Zimbabwe’s tobacco 
sector, Tianze in the 2013/14 season invested several tens 
of millions of dollars on the contract farming scheme. 
As the general manager of Tianze Company, Mr. Zhang, 
said,
Before Tianze was founded, the price of tobacco 
was controlled by western companies and as 
western countries imposed sanction on Zimbabwe, 
farmers gave up growing the crop. Tianze broke the 
monopoly through offering higher prices and more 
re-started growing tobacco after that. 
The impact of Tianze on the local tobacco market was 
confirmed by the CEO of MTC, who have operational 
partnerships with Tianze: ‘We worked with China, but 
we had no Chinese investment. China is the biggest 
purchaser of tobacco in Zimbabwe, if there is now more 
competition and confidence in the industry, farmers can 
get better prices.’
Tianze currently has 378 contract farming agreements, 
255 of which are active. The total area contracted by the 
company in the 2013/14 season was 8,467ha. Among 
the active farmers, 161 of them got input support from 
Tianze for a total area of 6,974ha. The remaining 94 
farmers cultivated a total of 1,493ha without input 
support. The minimum area per contracted farmer set 
by that company is 10ha and the larger the area per 
farmer the more preferable it is for the company. Among 
the contract farmers the highest area is 300ha of tobacco. 
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Tianze only starts to provide the inputs after monitoring 
the performance of a prospective client for a season. 
The input package includes seed, fertilisers, pesticides, 
fuel (diesel or petrol), coal and payment for electricity. 
These inputs are provided by suppliers to farmers and 
procedures have been put in place to ensure that the 
inputs are not abused. Loans are repaid with tobacco 
harvest at fixed values and the company terminates 
support for farmers in default. Support may be resumed 
if farmers can clear their debts through tobacco deliveries 
with input support sought from elsewhere. The total cost 
of inputs per hectare is estimated to be US$10,000, and 
the yield is 3-3.5t/ha. The average price for contract 
farmers was US$3.36/kg, contrasting with US$2.84/kg 
for the auction crop. At the close of tobacco sales in 2014, 
the average price for both the contract and auction crops 
was US$3.21/kg. In China, however, per hectare input 
costs are only about US$4,000, and in 2014 a CNTC 
delegation that visited Zimbabwe implored Zimbabwean 
officials to explore ways of reducing costs. 
As a result of these high input costs, many farmers 
cannot grow tobacco without external financial support. 
One farmer who highlighted this issue was Mr. Stockil, 
a white commercial farmer who farms 56ha of tobacco 
and 8ha of maize. Since joining Tianze, all of the inputs 
for his tobacco crop in the 2013/14 season were provided 
by the company. They provided tractors, chemicals, coal, 
fuel and many other materials at a total value of support 
of US$323,000. This was provided as an interest-free loan 
to be repaid by selling the tobacco produced to Tianze. 
Mr. Stockil’s total yield of tobacco in 2014 was 212,800kg 
on 56ha, while the price given by Tianze was US$3.73/
kg. This was significant, as one local farmer had said 
himself that ‘without Tianze tobacco, only 20 hectares 
can be managed.’ In order to operate this farm, he had 
hired 150 workers, among them 50 permanent and 100 
casual workers, and each casual worker was being paid 
the stipulated minimum farm wage. In his case, it was 
thus due to the continued demand for Zimbabwe’s 
premium tobacco from China and the subsequent 
investment from Tianze that more employment 
opportunities were created. 
Another case was that of another local farmer. She 
grew 15ha of tobacco in the 2013/14 season. Before 
signing a contract with Tianze, she was contracted by 
TSF, a local, long-established merchant that also owns 
one of the tobacco auction floors. She says that she 
moved to working with Tianze because of the better 
service: 
I can visit the headquarters of Tianze and talk with 
Chinese managers, I can also get technical assistance 
from the company, such as on agronomy and curing, 
and these technologies are useful. Without the help 
of the company, I can’t grow tobacco
The farmer reiterated that she will continue signing 
contracts with the company, and planting more tobacco. 
Our research suggested that many farmers with large 
tobacco operations preferred to be supported by Tianze 
due to the cheaper and timelier input support, as well 
as the higher purchasing prices. Tianze charge a more 
modest interest on the input loan package, unlike their 
competitors who often charge 12 percent in interest.
China-Africa Cotton Company
China-Africa Cotton Company (CAC) was founded in 
2008 as a joint venture between Qingdao Ruichang 
Cotton Industrial Co., Ltd. (青岛瑞昌棉业有限公司), 
Qingdao Huifu Textile Co., Ltd. (青岛汇富纺织有限公司) 
and the China-Africa Development (CAD) Fund (CAC 
undated). CAC started operations in Zimbabwe towards 
the end of 2013 for the 2013/14 summer and had 29,120 
contract farmers registered with it at the time of research 
(out of the 200,000 among all companies). The company 
expects to increase these numbers further in the 
following seasons. The company commanded the second 
largest share of business among all registered cotton 
merchants, coming after Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
(Cottco) and ahead of Cargill, who have both been 
operating in Zimbabwe for over 15 years. The average 
area of planted cotton among contract farmers registered 
with the company is 1.8ha, slightly less than the industry 
average of 2ha. All registered cotton companies have to 
comply with regulations that were developed and agreed 
by the industry with the concurrence of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development 
(MoAMID) and farmer associations. The guidelines have 
now been put into law through a Statutory Instrument 
(SI) that was passed by the government. Under the 
regulations, each cotton merchant has to supply farmers 
with inputs and each is prohibited from buying a cotton 
crop that was grown with inputs provided by other 
companies. A statutory body called the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority enforces the SI. 
At the beginning of each season, cotton companies 
agree on a minimum input package to be provided to 
farmers. The minimum package per hectare set for the 
2013/14 season was two 50kg bags of basal cotton 
fertiliser, a 50kg bag of top dressing fertiliser, a 15kg bag 
of seed, 1.5l of synthetic pyrethroids, 1kg of Carbaryl 85 
WP and 100g of Aphicide. The provision of chemicals is 
compulsory for all contracted farmers (for pest control) 
but farmers in areas where the soil still has significant 
inherent fertility opt to not take up fertilisers (especially 
in the Zambezi Valley and the Lowveld). In the 2013/14 
planting season, all the inputs were sourced by the 
company which incurred a further cost of about 
US$500,000 in transporting the inputs to farmers. 
Merchants were buying the crop from farmers at an 
average price of US$0.50/kg, implying that CAC required 
at least US$20m for the 40,000t it expected to purchase.
CAC (along with other Chinese companies) has had 
an advantage as it has access to cheaper sources of funds 
from the CAD Fund. The company mentioned this aspect 
as its major advantage and that it passed on the lower 
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costs to farmers through charging lower interest rates 
on borrowed inputs. By comparison, local cotton 
companies have been borrowing money at 15-18 percent 
interest rates and have thus passed on these higher costs 
to farmers. Due to this access to lower cost finance, the 
input package per hectare for China Africa Cotton is 
about US$115 compared to US$166 amongst its 
competitors.
The growing of cotton will remain a major livelihood 
activity among smallholder farmers, particularly those 
in low rainfall areas. As the crop is labour intensive and 
most cotton farmers have had to hire additional casual 
workers for picking the crop, it can be a valuable source 
of employment. Additionally, the crop is a cash crop that 
most smallholder farmers have experience in growing. 
In the past, farmers have managed to meet a host of 
household expenses from the proceeds of cotton sales. 
But low producer prices are forcing farmers to pay 
contract workers low wages and as a result most cotton 
farmers have lately been struggling to attract enough 
workers. 
To obtain farmers’ opinions on contract farming and 
CAC, the researchers interviewed five farmers in Karoi 
Region who were contracted by CAC. From their 
responses, the input package is by far the most important 
component of the contract farming arrangement. 
As discussed earlier, the recommended input package 
agreed by the cotton industry is 2 bags of basal dressing 
and 1 bag of top dressing. Some merchants reduce this 
unilaterally to 1 bag of basal and ½ to 1 bag of top 
dressing, which could partly explain why farmers often 
change contractors from season to season – a 
development that delays the disbursement of inputs 
through long registration processes with merchants each 
year. Farmers commended CAC for providing an improved 
package (especially higher quality fertilisers) and 
supplying the first batch of inputs early. Farmers got 2 
bags of basal fertiliser and 1 bag of top dressing from 
CAC; this represents a doubling of the basal fertiliser level 
from the previous industry-wide standard. 
Contract farmers also received training and technical 
assistance from the cotton companies. Training is done 
by extension workers recruited locally and all companies 
use an industry-wide agreed curriculum. Field Days4  are 
held at the homesteads of farmers who excel in each 
area. Such gatherings serve as additional training 
platforms for farmers as well as motivation. 
Among the commercial crops suited to the Karoi area 
are cotton, maize, soybean and flue-cured tobacco. On 
the basis of returns tobacco gives the highest margin, 
followed by maize, soybean and then cotton. There is a 
high proportion of farmers who are members of the 
apostolic religious sect in this (Karoi) area. The sect 
encourages polygamy and prohibits its followers from 
growing and handling tobacco. The big families 
associated with polygamy are therefore a source of 
significant (family) labour which is crucial in successfully 
growing a cotton crop. Although margins were reported 
to be higher with maize as compared to cotton, most 
farmers were deterred from committing high areas to 
maize due to the high cost of hybrid seeds and fertilisers 
associated with it. The use of hybrid maize seed (rather 
than selecting the best of the commercial crop as seed) 
is now almost universal and farmers are constrained by 
the high fertiliser rates (at 8 bags basal and 8 bags top 
dressing). Interest in soybeans has similarly remained 
subdued due to low yields, low producer prices and high 
labour demands for harvesting the crop. 
The company operates through three departments 
at its headquarters: the Finance Department, Business 
Department (imports and exports) and Cotton 
Department (the most important department that 
administers the field operations for contracted farmers). 
In each department a Chinese manager works with two 
to three local support staff. In total there are ten local 
workers employed at the CAC headquarters. The largest 
local employee group more broadly is within the Cotton 
Department and includes regional managers and 
extension workers. As part of its Cotton Department, the 
company has nine regional managers, 50 extension 
officers and 25 supervisors who undertake audit duties. 
The nine operational areas for the company are in the 
main cotton growing areas: Checheche, Chiredzi, 
Rutenga, Kadoma, Gokwe, Sanyati, Chinhoyi/Karoi, 
Mzarabani and North-Eastern (for Mt Darwin/Dotito and 
Rushinga areas). 
Field management staff up to regional managers are 
issued with all-terrain company vehicles that are fuelled 
and serviced by CAC. Each extension officer is issued 
with a motorbike and is allocated 60l of fuel per month 
which can cover their operational area. Extension officers 
periodically interact with peers in other cotton companies 
and ensure that standards agreed upon by the Cotton 
Growers Association (to which all cotton merchants are 
members) are uniformly applied. 
The company also has two ginneries for processing 
the seed cotton and each has eight Chinese managers 
and a total of 300 local workers. Among the 300 workers, 
half of them are permanent contract workers and the 
rest are casuals.
Salaries under CAC are generally higher than with 
other companies but researchers were advised that they 
will be reviewed at the end of each season. CAC estimates 
that 3.5 percent of the salary budget is spent on 
commercial insurance which includes medical and 
accident cover. All the staff members are covered by the 
insurance scheme and the company spends about 
US$300,000 for such coverage each year. 
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Challenges and Uncertainty for 
Chinese companies 
Following Zimbabwe’s land reform programme in 
2000, Western countries imposed heavy sanctions on 
the country over alleged human-rights abuses and the 
breakdown in rule of law. To resuscitate the economy in 
the years that followed, the government of Zimbabwe 
embarked on a major campaign of wooing investors from 
alternative sources. The ‘Look East’ policy was a major 
initiative in this regard and most Chinese companies 
came to establish themselves in this period, especially 
between 2003 and 2008. Effectively, just as the West 
began to ostracise Zimbabwe, China had just embarked 
on its ‘Going Global’ initiative. 
In 2010, Zimbabwe passed the Indigenization and 
Economic Empowerment Act, which prohibited foreign 
investors from owning a majority stake in any business 
(up to 49 percent equity). The Law rattled foreign 
investors who feared their businesses would be 
expropriated. However, as China had been most 
forthcoming at the country’s greatest time of need, 
Chinese companies were given special dispensation by 
the Zimbabwean government and allowed to own 
majority stakes in certain businesses. This is especially 
important in the cases presented by Tianze and Wanjin 
in that they are both state entities and Chinese law 
prohibits them from forming joint companies with other 
entities, even abroad. Despite the assurances of special 
consideration regarding compliance with the 
Indigenization Act given to Chinese companies by the 
Government of Zimbabwe, the companies however feel 
particularly vulnerable considering the level of 
investment in fixed assets they have made to date.
The following section discusses other specific 
challenges facing each of the three Chinese investments 
and the future prospects of each.
Wanjin Company and the future
Wanjin has invested more than US$5m in their joint 
farming ventures. The money was borrowed from a 
Chinese bank and has to be repaid with interest. There 
have been concerns within the company that 
Zimbabwean law may not allow them to repatriate some 
of their profits to service the loan. Recently the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe amended the regulations to allow 
repatriation of profits, but Wanjin would have to fulfil a 
number of requirements before being allowed to do so, 
a process that could be arduous and expensive. 
The company has been in operation in Zimbabwe for 
just one year and has so far incurred losses from its 
business. From next year the company anticipates to 
make a modest profit but will still be servicing its loan. 
The Wanjin General Manager remarked, ‘We are all afraid 
of policy changes in Zimbabwe; land reform displaced 
white people; we are not sure if it will also expel the 
Chinese someday.’ Wanjin feels its investment is 
particularly vulnerable as not much profit is being 
generated from its current line of business and heavy 
investment has been needed to restore its partner farms’ 
infrastructure and purchase the necessary farming 
equipment.
A major concern raised by most key informants was 
the high cost of agricultural production in Zimbabwe. 
Average working capital needed for maize is about 
US$1240/ha, for wheat US$1850/ha and for soybean 
US$887/ha. The yields of maize, wheat and soybean are 
6t/ha, 5t/ha and 2t/ha respectively. In other words, the 
producer cost of maize is US$0.21/kg, of wheat US$0.37/
kg and of soybean US$0.40/kg. The production costs of 
these crops are actually much higher than they are in 
China which therefore makes them unappealing for 
Chinese buyers.
 
Tianze Tobacco Company and the future
Tianze tobacco has been operating in the country 
much longer and has been doing so at a profit. Tianze 
was invited following the precipitous decline in tobacco 
deliveries due to challenges with securing funding. 
Currently over 75 percent of the tobacco crop is produced 
under contract and the regulatory and marketing 
authority for that crop (Tobacco Industry and Marketing 
Board) has successfully established order in the industry. 
There have been no reports of substantial cases of 
contracts being breached by either the merchants or the 
farmers. Over 95 percent of the crop is exported.
Since Tianze handles all tobacco imports from 
Zimbabwe into mainland China, it still has significant 
influence over pricing. Amongst the merchants registered 
to buy tobacco in Zimbabwe, prices offered by Tianze 
have been among the highest. The support package 
offered to its contractors also appears to be the most 
comprehensive. In the season when the field survey was 
undertaken, Tianze also charged the lowest interest 
under contract arrangements. Furthermore, although 
Tianze raised some concerns on the level of default 
among its contracted growers, these levels remained 
manageable. In any case, it is always in the interest of 
their contracted farmers to clear arrears with the 
company, as tobacco merchants closely share databases 
of their registered growers.
Business prospects for Tianze will remain bright, on 
the back of firm demand for the premium crop from China 
and the host government’s indebtedness to the company 
for quickly responding to its invitation to set up the 
investment. The government of Zimbabwe has however 
requested Tianze to set up a cigarette manufacturing 
factory in Zimbabwe in line with its policy of local 
beneficiation and discouraging the export of raw 
materials. In response, the company maintains that they 
only required Zimbabwe’s premium crop for blending 
with other tobacco leaves in China, which means Tianze 
may find it difficult to meet that request.
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China Africa Cotton Company and the 
future
CAC faces some of the most formidable challenges of 
the three, the most serious being competition from other 
companies. There are at least seven other companies, 
among them Cottco, Cargill, Romsdal, Alliance Ginneries, 
Olam, Grafax, Sino Zimbabwe, Jinmac and Sino-tex. 
Cottco, Cargill and CAC are the top three companies and 
between them command as much as 50 percent of the 
market. Competition among the companies has always 
been relentless. Despite the Zimbabwean government 
having developed fairly robust guidelines for regulating 
the industry, numerous cases of merchants and farmers 
flouting the rules over the past seasons have been 
reported. This is particularly manifest in cases of side-
marketing, for which several merchants have already 
taken families to court to serve as a deterrent to other 
would-be defaulters. It is reported that merchants could 
have lost as much as a third of the crop to side-marketing 
in 2012, a loss estimated at US$19m (Sunday Mail 2013). 
Another challenge faced by the company is the 
increasingly poor yield from the crop. This has ranged 
from 440kg/ha in 2009/10 to 770kg/ha in 2012/13 
(MoAMID, various). Moreover, although the generating 
capacity of cotton in Zimbabwe currently stands at 
700,000ha, the area of farmland allocated for cotton 
production has been fluctuating between seasons in 
response to viability. Lately, this has been characterised 
by a major decline as shown in Table 3 below.
Season Oct. 2009 Nov. 2010 Dec. 2011 2012/13 2013/14
Area under cotton
(ha)
261,191 379,689 432,709 239,335 201,678
Table 3: Trends in area planted to cotton in Zimbabwe, 2009-2013
Source: MoAMID (various)
Legislators have recently expressed concern over the 
challenges confronting the cotton industry, even alleging 
that farmers have been abandoning the crop due to 
imprudent government policies. For example, in the year 
2015, the government asked all cotton companies to 
offer input packages worth at least US$148 per hectare. 
Farmers would then be expected to pay this back in 
cotton, but the price and yield of cotton was so low that 
farmers would not have received a good income if they 
paid back the input packages. Legislators also argue that 
the country has missed out on some key technological 
advances, which has resulted in Zimbabwe’s cotton crop 
being uncompetitive. Overall, more than 70 percent of 
Zimbabwe’s crop is exported, and cotton companies have 
based their prices each year on the outlook from the 
world market – much to the chagrin of local farmers who 
insist local costs of production be used as the primary 
basis for price negotiation. As a result, farmers have been 
moving to other crops such as tobacco and maize. 
These issues are clearly not restricted to CAC; even 
the more established cotton companies appear to be 
suffering. Due to historical advantages, Cottco has always 
occupied the pole position among the cotton companies. 
However, as a sign of the challenges faced across the 
cotton industry, it has also been making losses since 2009 
when the country demonetised its local currency and 
replaced it with the US Dollar. In the year ending 31 March 
2013, Cottco made a loss of US$14.9m. Despite the 
company reporting a modest profit of US$2m the 
previous year, the company remains in a precarious state, 
as it continues to service significant debts estimated at 
US$126m in March 2013 and US$41m in March 2014 
(Mtomba 2014). Furthermore, in the 2014 marketing year 
the company handled a crop of only 35,665t against its 
target of 110,000t, and by October 2014 Cottco had 
applied to the courts for judicial management (bankruptcy 
protection). This was intended to form a shield against 
claims on the company when what it owed far exceeded 
what was owing to it. It remains questionable if the 
company will be able to offer the expected level of 
support to farmers in the 2014/15 season. 
Lastly, Cargill, a multinational US-registered company, 
claimed to suffer such consistent challenges that it closed 
its Zimbabwe business in 2014 citing a poor crop and 
high levels of contract breach by its registered growers. 
The company was the third largest cotton merchant and 
accounted for 15 percent of the nation’s crop. It was one 
of the first companies to compete with Cottco when it 
started operations in Zimbabwe in 1996, when the laws 
that established Cottco as the sole monopoly for the 
industry were repealed. 
Conclusions
In summary, what this study shows us is that we cannot 
necessarily conclude that company structures have 
played a huge role in terms of commercial success. 
Despite ongoing discussions of China’s ‘State Capitalist’ 
model and the efficiency of private versus public sector 
enterprise, it would appear that all of these companies 
have had to balance their own commercial experiences 
from China with the challenging realities of Zimbabwe’s 
political, social and market circumstances. While all three 
of these case studies have stable funding and all of them 
enjoyed the support that came from strong relations 
between the Chinese and Zimbabwean governments, 
each had very different outcomes.
The provincial SOE, Wanjin, appears to be suffering 
the most, and despite its status as an SOE and favourable 
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concessions at the outset, still feels at risk of expropriation 
of the land it contracts. It brings with it experiences 
developed through its Anhui Farming operations in 
China, including inputs, technology, financial 
management and so forth. Yet it seems unable to 
overcome the prohibitive production costs and has 
struggled to help indebted farms return to full 
productivity and profitability. Depending on how much 
concessionary funding continues to be available to the 
company, longer term investments may still turn a profit, 
but for the time being there is a sense that the days of 
their current operations are numbered. 
Conversely, Tianze has been hugely successful. The 
financial stability of being a subsidiary of one of China’s 
most powerful SOEs has surely given it greater scope to 
invest substantially across Zimbabwe’s abundant tobacco 
sector. However, this success is also buoyed by the fact 
that the Zimbabwean government was keen on this 
specific form of investment and therefore offered them 
a greater degree of political stability and support in the 
form of legal and economic concessions. Furthermore, 
China’s strong demand for tobacco is perhaps the most 
important factor behind the company’s success, as Tianze 
acts as an intermediary between all other tobacco 
producers and companies in Zimbabwe and one of the 
world’s most lucrative tobacco markets. 
Lastly, the private cotton company with funding from 
the CAD Fund is also facing significant challenges. With 
the local market leader, Cottco, filing for bankruptcy 
protection, and Cargill closing its operations in Zimbabwe, 
it is clear that times are bad in the industry. This is partly 
due to stiff competition, but more importantly, decreasing 
crop yields and a lack of inputs have spurred local farmers 
to shift their attention to other crops – which then 
reduces total outputs further. As with Wanjin it is unclear 
what the future holds: whether continued finance will 
prove to be a wise move while times are bad, or whether 
it is just pouring more money into a situation that will 
ultimately prove unprofitable anyway. Again, though, 
what we see is a case of local dynamics playing out in 
ways that are beyond the control of company structures. 
From the Zimbabwean perspective, these investments 
have all been very welcome, and there is clearly a 
commitment to ensure long-term engagements. Yet it 
seems that how the state addresses issues within its 
agricultural sector, and particularly the cotton market, 
will really be the most important deciding factor for the 
future of these Chinese companies. This will no doubt 
aim to balance the interests of farmers with those of 
companies, be they Zimbabwean, Chinese or from 
elsewhere. 
Henceforth, although all three Chinese companies 
maintain that they invested in Zimbabwe’s agricultural 
sector for the long haul, it is possible that the unforeseen 
challenges which have befallen Wanjin and CAC may 
seriously impede their long-term prospects. Together, 
these three case studies disprove the narrative of 
unstoppable Chinese business successes in Africa, and 
particularly within the agricultural sector. Rather, they 
present a reality that is a lot messier on the ground and 
together they take us a step closer to understanding the 
challenges and opportunities of Chinese companies in 
Africa.
End Notes
1  This research was co-funded by the China and Brazil 
in African Agriculture (CBAA) project, China 
International Development Research Network 
(CIDRN) research funding and the Beijing Youth Elite 
Programme
2 The utilisation percentage could be even lower if 
the potential for irrigation in winter is factored in. 
3 The two payments are made monthly for each 
employee to the National Social Security Authority 
through which the worker (or surviving relatives) 
can claim compensation in case of injury or death 
at work, or on retirement.
4  Field Day: this is a function hosted by the best 
farmer (usually for a village) for a given crop. Several 
Field Days can be held in a season at key stages of 
the crop but most emphasis is given to the one 
held when the crop is ready for harvesting. The host 
farmer shares with guests how the various 
management practices were undertaken. Some 
refreshments are usually served, with a commercial 
company funding the event.
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